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FOREWORD
This paper is an attempt to show, mainly through the
interpretations of the laws as recorded in the state reporter
system, the development and the present status of the defence
of insanity in regard to criminal responsibility in Massachu-
setts.
It is not an effort to summarize the laws of other states.
It is not, deliberately, a description of fiendish crimes,
or an outline of the care and treatment given insane prisoners,
or the picture of the typical court-room procedure at a crimi-
nal trial.
Though all of these components of the legal machinery are
important in themselves, in relation to each other, and alto-
gether contribute to the practical working of the law, this
thesis is an earnest endeavor to point out, only, the changes
which have taken place in the le?al conception of the degree of
insanity sufficient to relieve the defendant of criminal
responsibility.
The criminal law, for the most part, remains precisely as
it was a hundred years ago. The changes in ways of living over
the years have made obsolete some crimes and introduced other
"criminal'’ acts. But the concept of the criminal actor and his
personal responsibility for his deeds has been little altered
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by the increasing knowledge of doctors and psychiatrists of the
functioning of the mind, especially in an abnormal condition,
and its influence on the actions of the individual.
What 1 wish to emphasize is, tnat because of the persistency
in the law of the early theological explanations of human behaviour
explanations which have largely been discredited by modern medicine
it is difficult to incorporate medico-psychiatric knowledge in the
law of insanity
*
INTRODUCTION
The "basis of the law in Massachusetts is today almost
exactly what it was in the first days of the Colony's settle-
ment. The belief to which the Puritans tenaciously clung, that
every man is a free moral agent, has been inculcated in every
generation since in one guise or another, * In the law of the
land it has been expressed time and again to the effect that
every man has ’’freedom of will and responsibility for act3
flowing therefrom.”1
In tracing any phase of the development of law in Massa-
chusetts it is apparent that changes in keeping with the times
have been few. Especially has this been so in the evolution of
the legal status of insanity as a defence for criminal activity.
Each change has been brought about, not by a substitution of
more intelligent assumptions for, or even by an alteration of,
the old assumptions in this section of the law but by the mere
addition of laws to the antiquated basis. Contradicting the
old theory that all persons have freedom of choice and conse-
quent responsibility for their actions, the new conceptions
of criminal responsibility have had to be subtly tacked on as
^Sheldon Glueck, "Mental Hygiene and Crime”, Readings
in Mental Hygiene, ed. Ernest R. Groves and Phyllis M.
Blanchard (New York, 1936), p. 97.
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2afterthoughts to the original proposition. In the main, however,
the only laws which could possibly have followed from the
original assumptions have been made and they continue to form
the structure of the body of law pertaining to the defence of
insanity.
Returning to the basic assumptions in the criminal law
with reference to insanity as a criminal defence, it is obvious
that they themselves resulted quite logically from the hard
and fast theological dictum of Colonial days that every in-
dividual was free to choose his own line of action.
The most important assumption of all, second only to the
freedom-of-will-and-responsibility-for-ensuing-acts clause
,
and issuing from it, is the presumption of sanity. At the
same time that it is assumed that every man can himself direct
his action it is also implied that every man has the mental
ability to do that directing. Therefore, every man, law-abiding
or criminal, is considered sane. As late as 1856, in a trial
for murder where the sanity of the slayer was questioned, the
Judge in his instructions to the jury said in part:
The law infers, from the fact that a
prisoner is a human being, of sufficient
age to be deemed capable of committing
crimes, the further fact that he is a
reasonable^ being, that is, that he is of
sane mind.^
^Commonwealth v. 3ddy, 7 Gray 583
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3Only a few years ago, in a 1944 case, the same idea was simi-
larly expressed:
The propriety of an inference or even a
technical presumption that the condition
of a person or thing, or the conduct of
a person, is normal and customary, has
often been recognized. 3
In every trial it is presumed that the defendant is sane. It
rests upon the defendant himself to interject a question
regarding his sanity. He may do this before the trial commences
by making a special plea or he may raise the issue at any time
during the trial. Immediately that the doubt of sanity has
been introduced the government has the burden of proving the
defendant's sanity. In other words, it is the duty of the de-
fendant to raise the question of his criminal responsibility
and it is the obligation of the government to prove his crimi-
nal responsibility. The issue of sanity is determined then,
not as a matter of law, but as a matter of fact by the Jury,
by weighing the evidence of sanity PLUS the presumption of
sanity against the evidence of insanity. A clear explanation
of this practise which also stresses the emphasis to be placed
upon the presumption of sanity appeared in 1844:
The ordinary presumption is, that a person
is of sound mind, until the contrary
appears; and in order to shield one from
criminal responsibility the presumption
must be rebutted by proof of the contrary,
satisfactory to the Jury. Such proof may
arise, either out of the evidence offered
by the prosecutor to establish the case
3Spstein v. -Boston Housing Authority, 317 I«Iass. 297.
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4against the accused, or from distinct
evidence, offered on his part; in
either case, it must he sufficient to
establish the fact of insanity; other-
wise, the presumption will stand. 4
The duty of the Jury is even better put forward in Commonwealth
v. Cooper.
But the question is not to be finally
settled by medical science or by legal
definition from the bench, although
each may be of material assistance to
the Jury. It is the duty of the Judge
to state clearly and sufficiently what
the Jury are to decide by a careful
discrimination between the law and the
facts which they may find upon the
evidence.
5
The fact that the presumption of sanity, unlike other
legal presumptions which fade away with the first introduction
of contrary evidence, exists all through the trial, further
illustrates the tendency of the law to strongly favor the
notion that all men are sane. The presumption can withstand
evidence for:
Although the burden of proof is on the
Commonwealth to prove the defendant
mentally responsible for crime, the fact
that a great majority of men are sane,
and the probability that any particular
man is sane, may be deemed by a Jury to
outweigh, in evidential value, testimony
that he is insane. This is the effect of
what was said in 204 Mass. 358, 212 Mass.
438, 257 Mass. 21, although the form of
expression may be criticized on the
^Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48- Met. 500.
^Commonwealth v. Cooper, 219 Mass. 1.
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5ground that in truth it is not, as
stated in those cases, the presumption
of sanity that may be weighed as evi-
dence, but rather the rational proba-
bility on which the presumption rests. 6
A fuller explanation of the functioning of the presumption in
relation to the burden of proof was contained in the Epstein
case:
fhere is nothing inconsistent in casting
the burden of proof upon a party, and
then helping him sustain his burden by
creating a presumption in his favor that
throws upon his adversary the burden of
going forward with the evidence. The
distinction between the burden of proof
and the burden of going forward with
evidence has long been recognized by this
court. Indeed, a presumption, using the
word in its technical and proper sense,
can have no operative effect unless it
assists the party having the burden of
proof. 7
^Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409.
7£pstein v. Boston Housing Authority, 317 Mass. 297.
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6CHAPTER I
WHAT 13 A CHIMB?
In order to be responsible for a crime the individual must
have had the necessary purpose and intent to do the criminal
act and he must have committed the act.
...the jury must be satisfied not only
that he did the act charged, but that
he was a responsible agent.®
One factor without the other disqualifies the action of the
person as criminal, ho amount of malicious speculation about
or contemplation of an illegal act can make a person a criminal.
Likewise, the lack of intent and wilful purposing on the part
of the person who has done an act, though criminal in nature,
erases the act as a crime.
And, as a vicious will without a vicious
act is no civil crime, so, on the other
hand, an unwarrantable act v/ithout a
vicious will is no crime at all. 3o that
to constitute a crime against human laws,
there must be, first, a vicious will; and,
secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon
such vicious will.
9
In Commonwealth v. Gilbert the first requested instruction
to the jury was*.
The jury must be satisfied, in order to
convict the prisoner, not only of the
^Commonwealth v. heath, 11 Gray 303.
^Blackstone, quoted by Albert J. Harno, Cases and Mate-
rials on Criminal Law and Procedure .( 2nd ed.
,
Chicago ,1939 ) ,p26.
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7acts which constitute murder, but that
they proceeded from a responsible agent,
one capable of committing the offence. 10
i'he judge's instructions included this one in different words:
hT ow one thing which is essential to the
guilt of the defendant is to show that
this defendant has committed the crime.
And it is a general rule of law that, in
order to be able to commit a crime, a
person who is charged with its commission
must have intelligence and capacity
enough to have a criminal intent and
purpose. At any rate, when the charge is
of the commission of such a crime as
this, if he was not capable of a criminal
intent and purpose, if he had no criminal
intent and purpose in what he did, then
he cannot have been guilty of a crime in
doing what he did.H
As we have mentioned before at length, the basic assump-
tions of our Massachusetts' law state that any man is capable
of choosing his own ways of living, and when his ways are con-
trary to the rules of ordered society, he being a responsible
individual, is liable to punishment, hut if, for some reason.
he has not the power to form an intent to commit a specific
crime, he cannot be held responsible for the act.
^Commonwealth Gilbert, 1G5 Mass. 45.
Hlbid.
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8CHAPTER II
WHAT 13 INSANITY?
Those rales which make up the body of law of Massachusett
s
comprise a standard which is supposed to govern the conduct of
every individual within the Commonwealth. Every law has been
made in the interest of the general well-being of the people:
for their protection a certain type of socially acceptable
behavior has been set up as a model^ deviations from which entail
punishment in kind. The purpose of the law, over and above the
protection of the individual, is the protection of the larger
entity, the society. Consequently, the more serious the offense
against the safety of the public welfare the more difficult it
is to evade punishment. Defences which purport to prove in-
ability to form an intent to commit a specific crime are there-
fore handled with caution.
In the use of insanity as a defence for responsibility
this legal philosophy i3 evident. The question is not "Is the
prisoner sane or insane?" but "Does he, through disease of the
mind, lack the knowledge of the moral wrongness of the crime
itself and its affect on the society of which he is a member?"
Recognizing that there is no definite distinction between
sanity and insanity at the borderline and that the question then
becomes the determination of the degree of insanity necessary
to amount to a legal defence for responsibility, which is the
..
9obliteration of reason, it is almost unbelievable that the
criterion of such a technical affliction and even its presence
should be matters for law-makers and jury to decide. It would
seem that experts on mental diseases such as doctors and
psychiatrists should identify that insanity sufficient to excuse
criminal responsibility and that the experts on law should
dispose of the criminal insane case through the customary legal
channels.
While the law, then, has attempted to protect the group
from the criminal acts of the insane individual, medicine and
the later specialized field of psychiatry have attempted to
explain what the disease insanity is that is causal in making
certain individuals commit the criminal acts which they do.
With the advent of a firmer belief in the value of the
scientific method of studying phenomena, medical men began
seeking a more satisfactory explanation of insanity than had
hitherto been offered in theological terms. Because of their
particular training and limited knowledge of the human body
doctors were inclined to assume that all mental abnormality
resulted from impairment of the brain. For many years, until in
fact about the turn of the last century, insanity and other
forms of mental deficiency were believed to be organically
caused: that is, either the brain itself never developed to its
full capacity or it was damaged by some disease. It was not
until the science known as psychology had gained some repute in
the early 1900’s that doctors commenced to have some confidence
.
in the psychologist's theory that some abnormal mentality was
caused by a functional disorganization of ideas rather than by
any organic trouble. Working together, the doctor who studied
the biology of the individual, and the psychologist who studied
the nature of the mind and individual experience, the two once
widely divergent systems of thought were able to be coordinated
*
and produced much more fruitful research. Though it is still
impossible to know if some forms of insanity are the results of
functional or organic disorders, by tapping the knowledge of
both medicine and psychology, the psychiatrists have come to
better understand the expression of the man of unsound mind and
to probe the possibilities of prevention and treatment and cure
of the mentally abnormal.
Of course all of those included as mentally abnormal by
medico-psychiatric experts are by no means so unbalanced as to
be called insane. To them any person not what would be termed
"normally’' adjusted to his environment would demonstrate
"abnormality". It is the degree of mental abnormality which
defines insanity.
In accordance with the ideas of the psychiatrist that the
degree of mental abnormality determines insanity the law has
tried to compose legal tests which will detect that degree of
insanity which will relieve a defendant of responsibility for
his criminal acts. But because the ultimate aim of the law is
the guardianship of the security of the populace it has not
changed noticeably in relation to insanity.

11
In the formative years of the Massachusetts law on insanity
as a defence, the two forces which molded its fundamental
structure were the strict theology of New England settlers which
insisted on the existence of freedom of will and personal
responsibility for actions, and the doctrine of the physicians
that true insanity had only an organic basis. In the present day,
though the law has escaped somewhat from the theological decree
of punishment of all criminals, it has not made a similar ad-
vance in supplementing with up-to-date knowledge its out-moded
ideas of insanity. The reason often cited for this discrepancy,
as has been mentioned before, is that for the good of all it is
not possible to have lax laws though they may be favorable to a
small number of individuals. The truth of the matter is, that
before the law can benefit from medico- psychiatric knowledge
it will have to change its conception of the nature of the
human individual from a self-directing being to one who is
deeply influenced by his social environment as well as by his
heredity.
As it now stands legal ' ?insanity’ , is, strictly, that degree
of mental disorder adequate to destroy knowledge of right and
wrong. What that degree is has been the disturbing question
which has been the turning point of all of the criminal insanity
cases in Massachusetts. In contrast to the ’’socially maladjusted’
definition of mental abnormality of the doctors and psychiatrists
the law restricts the definition of insanity to refer only to a
loss of mental ability to reason and appreciate moral right and
.. ,
- ,
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wrong. Beutsch has said that:
12
In its socio-legal sense, insanity
might he broadly defined as a state of
mental disorder of such kind or degree
as to render a person socially inefficient
and to make it necessary to place him
under social control. 12
From the standpoint of doctors, psychiatrists, and for the
good of society "social inefficiency" might appear to he a
critical test of insanity. However, as the legal definition of
insanity rests now, it has not incorporated unto itself the
"socially inefficient" of present day society. In a condensation
of a judgment in the case of Commonwealth v. Gordon, 307 Mass.
155, it 7/as said that:
The broader conception of insanity that
medical men may entertain, as distin-
guished from the lack of mental capacity
that excuses a defendant from legal
responsibility for crime, has no legal
consequence in criminal cases. 1,5
12Albert Beutsch, The IJentally 111 in America (Hew
York, 1937), p. 386.
^Uassachusetts Digest Annotated , vol. 6, Cumulative
Annual Pocket (1945J, section 48.
»J rij. l
.
.
.
j i.
'
,
,
.
.
,
CHAPTER III
THE ENGLISH MW OH IHSAHITY A3 A CRIMINAL DEFENCE
It is only in fairly recent years that there has developed
a body of knowledge concerning the nature of insanity. The
causes of mental derangement, its effect upon the actions of
those whom it afflicts, and the possibilities of its curability,
though still not too well-known, at least comprise the basis of
a field of investigation which is objectively and scientifically
studied,
A few hundred years ago practically nothing was known of
disease of the mind excepting as a man was recognized as being
totally berserk and consequently very little was known or
guessed about the manifestations of a diseased mind in the
physical actions of the body. Because of this lack of knowl-
edge of what insanity was and especially a lack of knowledge
of its relation to individual actions, it was only in the in-
stance where a person was obviously absolutely insane that he
was excused from responsibility for his criminal acts on the
ground of insanity. Such was the state of knowledge in regard
to insanity and criminal responsibility in England as late as
the end of the 18th century.
One of the most prominent interpreters of the English
criminal law, lord Hale, proclaimed total insanity necessary to
..
1
•
•
'
,
'
, i> : i:
- i . .
'
BJl
.
«
*s-
g*T £
14
excuse responsibility . Referring to this statement If. Maudsley
The invisible line which it was so diffi-
cult to define was not, let it be noted
between sanity and insanity, but between
perfect and partial insanity. It was
thought no inhumanity towards the defects
of human nature to punish as a fully
responsible agent a person who was suf-
fering from partial insanity, whatever
influence the disease might have had upon
his unlawful act.^4
The requirement of total insanity as a defence became known as
the "wild beast" test. In the trial in England of Arnold for
murder (Arnold's Gase, 16 Howell's State Trials, 764) Justice
Tracy said:
It is not every kind of frantic humour,
or something unaccountable in a man's
actions, that points him out to be such
a madman as is exempted from punishment:
it must be a man that is totally de-
prived of his understanding and memory,
and doth not know what his is doing, no
more than an infant, than a brute or a
wild beast; such a one is never the
object of punishment .15
The ultimatum of complete madness was soon found to be
too stringent an interpretation of insanity necessary to excuse
one from legal responsibility. Though there was little addi-
tional insight into the characteristics of insanity, the
management of criminal trials in which the defendant's sanity
was questionable began to show that, in the mind3 of judges.
l^Henry Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental ldsease
(New York, 1883), p. 90.
15Ibid., p. 93.
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lawyers, and public officials, there was an inkling of a
possible connection betv/een partial disease of the mind and
responsibility for criminal acts.
In Hadfield's case, tried in 1800, one of the first effort^
was made to excase a man from criminal responsibility on the
ground of partial insanity. Suffering from an insane delusion,
Eadfield believed himself specially called upon by God to
sacrifice himself so that the world might be saved from de-
struction. But he also possessed the desire to die, not by his
own hand, but by that of another, and so he proceeded to fire
upon the Xing of England knowing his deed would be punished by
death. In spite of the fact that the law was not revised to
excuse a man on this ground of partial insanity, because his
act unquestionably resulted from his insane delusion, Hadfield
was acquitted. The difference of opinion was still, as Dr.
Maudsley has pointed out previously, concerned with a distinc-
tion between perfect and partial insanity and not between
sanity and insanity. Legally, total insanity was yet the
criterion of responsibility.
The next case pertinent to the test of insanity appeared
in 1812 when Bellingham, another victim of insane delusions,
was executed for murder. Whereas Hadfield, also laboring under
an insane delusion, had been acquitted for his crime, and
Bellingham was given the death sentence, the two cases seem on
the surface to be contradictory. Actually, however, they were
not; the different dispositions of two cases in which both
f .
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principals committed criminal acts at a time when each was
temporarily insane, effectively points tip the unsettled legal
attitude, supported by the absence of medical data, toward
considering anything less than total insanity as a defence for
freedom from criminal liability.
The freeing of Hadfield was a departure from the law far
in advance of the thought of the legal administrators of the
time. The explanation offered for the conviction of Bellingham
insisted that partial insanity, for example insane delusions,
was not sufficient to excuse one from criminal responsibility.
If the defendant could distinguish right from wrong at all, in
any respect, he was liable to punishment for his criminal acts.
This right and wrong test, simply another name for total
insanity, was to become, with only slight modification, the
critical test of insanity in both England and America in the
criminal courts. In 1843 a certain, now in legal circles
notorious, MeHaughten, killed a man whom he, under the influ-
ence of his insane delusion, believed to be defaming his
character. Because people in general were shocked to think
that an individual could be excused from murder on the ground
that such a delusion was insane, the judges were asked to reply
to questions concerning the status of insanity, and specifically
the status of that form of insanity, insane delusions, as a
defence for a man's criminal act.
In partial answer to the question "In what terms ought the
question to be left to the jury as to the prisoner’s state of
..
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mind at the time when the act was committed? r’ the Judges
stated:
...that the jury ought to be told in all
cases that every man is to be presumed
to be sane, and to possess a sufficient
degree of reason to be responsible for
his crimes, until the contrary be proved
to their satisfaction. That, to establish
a defence on the ground of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that at the time of
committing the act the accused was labour-
ing under such a defect of reason from
disease of the mind as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing,
or if he did know it that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong.
In this reply was embodied a condensation of the English
legal conception of insanity as a criminal defence which was
to be later copied by the colonists in Massachusetts. Besides
impressing upon the jury the legal importance of the presump-
tion of sanity, the Judges tried to clarify the legal test of
insanity. The points made were that:
1. The defendant must have been insane at
the time of committing the criminal act.
2. The defect of reason must have been di-
rectly caused by mental disease, and
3. The mind must have been so affected by
this disease that the person either
could not know that the act itself which
he committed was wrong, or if he did
realize the nature of the act he could
not understand that it was wrong to
commit it.
Once more the right and wrong test has appeared, this time to
16 James P. Stephens, A History of the Criminal Law of
England (London, 1883)
,
p. 158.
.•
.
•
•
*
„
,
(
18
include the original general knowledge of right and wrong and
to add another narrower view of insanity by declaring an in-
dividual to be insane if disease of the mind has affected his
reasoning so that he cannot possibly comprehend the nature of
the specific act which he has criminally executed. This is the
first outright acceptance of partial insanity as a sufficient
defence for criminal responsibility. Before MeNaughten 1 s Case,
the standard for legal insanity required a lack of discrimina-
tory ability between moral right and wrong in general.
Following up the admittance of partial insanity as a
defence Justice Tindal went on to describe the nature of insane
delusions equivilent to meet the partial insanity test.
Making the assumption as we did before,
namely, that he laboured under such
partial delusion only, and is not in
other respects insane, we think he must
be considered in the same situation as
to responsibility as if the facts with
respect to which the delusion exists
were real* 1*7
In other words, when total insanity is lacking, partial in-
sanity will serve as an excuse only if the individual, had he
been sane and having acted in the same way, due to circum-
stances, would have been excused. Using the classic example -
a sane person committing the criminal act of murder is excused
if he acted in self-defence. So too, if an insane person,
suffering from a delusion, murders in self-defence (as he
l^Albert J. Harno, Gases and Materials on Criminal Law
and Procedure (2nd ed.
,
Chicago, 1939 j, p. 146.
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supposes anyway) he will he excused. But just as a sane man
would he liable to punishment if he killed another for libel,
so would the insane man under similar circumstances. When the
sane man is excused from responsibility for his criminal acts
because of the facts the insane man is also excused even though
the facts existed only in his mind. The facts, therefore, as
they are in the insane man’s mind, if true would have excused
a sane man , will excuse him. An insane delusion, then, served
as a defence only if the defendant had had sense enough to be
deluded about facts, which, had they been true, would have been
a defence for a person in his normal mind.
The legal parley which resulted from McWaughten' s trial
established for the first time definitely, but with severe
restrictions, a test of part ial insanity. At the same time, in
this case, the judges modified the right and wrong test applied
to poor Bellingham. Instead of declaring a general knowledge of
moral right and wrong adequate to uphold the criminal responsi-
bility of a person, they admitted a knowledge of right and
wrong in respect to the particular criminal act at the time it
was committed as a test of responsibility.
-.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN ENGLISH LAW AND COLONIAL THINKING
ON INSANITY
The law of England, including the criminal law, wa3
practically appropriated in toto as the fundamental Massachu-
setts law. Upon the principles set down in the English insanity
cases the courts in Massachusetts formulated the legal status
of insanity as a criminal defence.
The original common assumption of freedom of will and con-
sequent responsibility for all actions flowing therefrom pre-
supposes that all people have the capacity to make choices. It
is obvious to any clear thinking person of this day that, if
it can be shown that an individual lacks the innate intelligence
to make a sensible choice, then he cannot be praised or blamed
for the choices he does make or for his actions resulting from
the choices he has made. To the early settlers of the Massachu-
setts colony, however, the logic of this analysis was not
acceptable. They were conscious of the fact that some individ-
uals could not or did not make choices in regard to their be-
haviour which were socially condoned. But never did they attrib-
ute this inappropriateness of choice to any deficiency of
mentality. The solution to them, on their level of thinking,
was crystal clear. Possession of the individual by the devil
was the answer. Anyone who conducted himself in a manner abhor-
..
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rent to the customary manner of acting was not relying on hi3
own initiative hat on orders from the devilish spirit which he
harbored. So relactant were they even to suggest that an in-
dividual could not direct his own life that in the late 1600's
the question in specific cases of poor behaviour was whether the
person had freely, of his own accord, invited the devil to take
him over and issue the orders. For example:
The only difference of opinion, during the
witchcraft excitement, among the leaders
of the three professions, the clergymen, the
physicians, the lawyers, and also the states-
men, was in regard to the question whether
spectral evidence, the seeing or the pro-
fessed seeing of the apparitions of the accused
in the form of cats, dogs, hog3, birds, etc.,
was proof that the accused were in VOLUNTARY
league with the devil to do evil; that it was
proof that they were doing the devil's work
was admitted by all parties in every direc-
tion; the point of dispute being only this -
whether their apparitions were proof that they
gave themselves up VOLUNTARILY to the service
of the devil, or whether they were taken
against their will; and this question was much
discussed; but all the weight of opinion, es-
pecially of the judges, was in favor of ex-
plaining the spectral evidence as proof of
voluntary service of the devil on the part of
the accused; hence it must be accepted; hence
it was accepted* hence the trials, convictions,
and executions.
Though it was seldom conceded that an insanely acting man
was not himself responsible for his submission to the devil, the
veiled intimation that there was at times a question S3 to the
devil's authority in taking over a person was perhaps one of
l^George M. Beard, The Psychology of the Salem Witchcraft
Excitement of 1692 and itsTractical Application to Our Own Time
(New York, 1882), pp. 56-57.
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the first indications that society was at last beginning to
think of the possibility of an abnormal intellect, the presence
of which was unaccounted for.
The theory of the early colonists’ conception of respon-
sibility for anti-social behaviour was well illustrated in the
witchcraft trials at Salem. Several insane children, plagued
by visions commonly in the forms of animals such as cats and
birds, accused citizens of the town of practising witchcraft on
them. In consequence of their testimony twenty innocent people
were put to death. The citizens of Salem, notably the physicians
it should be pointed out^. not once questioned the authenticity
of the childrens’ accusations. The controversy, on the contrary,
centered on the innocent persons named as witches. The decision
for the judges in the trials of the accused was to determine
whether or not the witches were voluntarily under the influence
of the devil for voluntary acceptance of possession by the
devil meant immediate execution. It is ironical that this first
advance or change in attitude toward the mentally abnormal,
though so slight, should have been made in the consideration of
a probably normal group of unjustly accused persons, while the
insane were passed over. A rather good phrasing of the situation
was written by Dr. Beard in comparing the way of thinking of
the Salem citizenry in regard to the witches with the way of
thinking of the people in regard to Guiteau, a lunatic accused
of murdering a President of the United States a few hundred
years later:
..
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In the case of Guiteau, the physicians and
politicians who were first called in to
make a diagnosis, mistook the symptoms of
insanity for the symptoms of wickedness;
an error which is quite as natural for non-
experts in insanity in our times as that of
the village physician of Salem, Dr. Griggs,
in witchcraft times, in attributing the
phenomena of trance and insanity to posses-
sion of the devil. 15
Considering the belief in witchcraft and sorcery which the
people of Salem held in 1692, and the disinterestedness of
doctors in any other than a traditional explanation of insanity
no thought of an inquiry into the behaviour of the insane
children was possible. The assumptions upon which the thinking
of the day was based allowed for no such investigation. The
unjustified murders of innocent people finally ceased, not
because of intelligent and logical thinking of cause for such
atrocities, but because of the pressure of public opinion.
When the children, at their own whim or through the crafty
advice of revengeful adults, began to point the finger of guilt
at people of prominence and prestige, the horrible trials
petered out. Persons of repute and influence, the clergyman's
wife for instance, could not, according to any man's reasoning
or feeling, be accused of witchcraft.
Gradually, over the years, it came to be recognized that
there were certain individuals who were not capable of ordinary
reasoning. Their actions were proof of an abnormal mind for it
was no longer believed that a power outside of the physical
19Ibid.
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body coaid perpetrate its activity or that sach people
willingly chose to act in such unsocial ways. The medical
profession, as far as it had investigated the causes of insan-
ity, had discovered that it issued from disease of the brain,
and this theory was received with favor by the translators of
the lav;.
Still the reluctance to relieve individuals of responsi-
bility for their actions remained, especially when they were
so threatening to the safety and security of the group that
they were looked upon as major crimes. This reluctance, so
strongly imbued in the early founders and settlers of Massa-
chusetts, has continued to be one of the outstanding and
and persistent factors to enter into every insane criminal
case which has come into the Massachusetts courts to the
present day. The main question in determining responsibility
for crime, has been and still is, deciding on that degree of
insanity which is acceptable as an adequate criminal defence.
..
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CHAPTER V
TESTS OE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AS THEY APPEAR IN
MASSACHUSETTS CASES
The most detailed and reliable clarifications, such as
they are, of wha£ is thought of as legal insanity in Massachu-
setts are to be found in the proceedings of criminal trials in
which the defendant claimed insanity as a defence.
One of the early cases to appear in Massachusetts, that of
Commonwealth v. Abner Rogers, Jr., in 1844, was the first to
lay down the law in regard to the test for the criminal respon-
sibility of the insane:
A man is not to be excused from responsi-
bility, if he had capacity and reason
sufficient to enable him to distinguish
between right and wrong, as to the par-
ticular act he is then doing; a knowledge
and consciousness that the act he is
doing is wrong and criminal, and will sub-
ject him to punishment. In order to be
responsible, he must have sufficient power
of memory to recollect the relation in
which he stands to others, and in which
others stand to him; that the act he is
doing is contrary to the plain dictates of
justice and right, injurious to others and
a violation of the dictates of duty.
On the contrary, although he may be labor-
ing under partial insanity, if he still
understands the nature and character of
his act, and its consequences; if he has
a knowledge that it is wrong and criminal,
and a mental power sufficient to apply
that knowledge to his own case, and to
know that, if he does the act, he will do
,• •
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wrong and receive punishment; such partial
insanity is not sufficient to exempt him
from responsibility for criminal acts.
If then it is proved, to the satisfaction
of the jury, that the mind of the accused
was in a diseased and unsound state, the
question will be, whether the disease
existed to so high a degree, that for the
time being it overwhelmed the reason, con-
science, and judgment, and whether the
prisoner, in committing the homicide, acted
from an irresistible and uncontrollable
impulse; If so, then the act was not the
act of a voluntary agent, but the involun-
tary act of the body, without the concur-
rence of a mind directing it.^O
Immediately noticeable is the similarity of thought in
this case and in the English cases, especially the one of Me-
Haughten. In a sense the Mcllaughten trial summarized the Eng-
lish law on insanity as a defence while the ease of Rogers,
borrowing from McUaughten, outlined the tests of insanity
which were to continue in use for many years in Massachusetts.
The principles expounded in this case show, by their very
wording, how great was the influence of the English decisions
up to that time on insanity as a criminal defence, and the
influence of the medical view that insanity was caused by
disease of the brain, and as was to be expected, reflected the
same theological dogma of freedom of will that was prevalent
in 17th century Massachusetts.
In accordance with the cases of Hadfield, Bellingham and
Mcllaughten in England, the Massachusetts law as written in
Rogers as to the degree of insanity sufficient to excuse
^Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Met. 500.
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liability, was strict. It stated, primarily, that the right and
wrong test was the test of responsibility though it departed
from the English cases which at times in practise refuted the
general right and wrong test for the particular right and wrong
test when it specifically narrowed it to pertain to the partic-
ular criminal act. Thus, if the jury was satisfied that the
defendant did not know the difference between right and wrong -
did not know that the act for which he was being prosecuted was
wrong - he was excused. If he could not see that his act was a
crime against society and therefore punishable for the good of
the public welfare, he was not responsible on the ground of
insanity. Irresistible impulse was thus accepted as an insanity
defence if the impulse resulted from mental disease and tempo-
rarily impaired the defendant's reason.
I1he test was further modified in regard to insane delusions
and in accordance with McNaughten when the judge declared that,
if the defendant was fully aware of the enormity of his crime
at the time he did it, even if he were partially insane (insane
delusions), he could not be excused. The stringent dictates of
the Massachusetts' law insisted that the reasoning ability of
the defendant must be impaired.
This demand seems to fit in nicely with the older belief
of the Puritanical founders that so long as a man has the
ability to reason he should be able to control his actions, i’he
right and wrong test, therefore, stands adamant: mental disease
must have affected the individual's power to think in order for
.'
5t9T ©l
.
.
.
.
;
him to be ^responsible for his deeds. The idea is well para-
phrased in the sentence "If so, then the act was not the act of
a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body, without
the concurrence of a mind directing it".
Again, as in Mchaughten, it was decided that, if the de-
fendant was to be excused from criminal responsibility on the
ground of insane delusions, he must be overpowered by a special
type of delusion. That is, if the factors of the delusion were
true and would constitute a defence for criminal activity for
a sane person, the insane man would not be liable to punish-
ment.
’Che re the delusion of a party is such that
he has a real and firm belief of the exist-
ence of a fact which is wholly imaginary,
and under that insane belief he does an act
which would be justifiable if such fact
existed, he is not responsible for such
act. 20
The next important insanity case was that of Commonwealth
v. Gilbert in 1895. Here the right and wrong test was further
upheld by the presiding judge in his instructions to the jury.
After describing the necessary effect of mental disease on the
intellectual faculties in these words:
If his (any defendant's) reason and mental
powers were either so deficient that he
had no will or conscience, no controlling
mental powers, or if through the over-
whelming power of mental disease his in-
££lbid
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tellectual pov/er was for the time ob-
literated, then he was not a respon-
sible moral agent, and is not answer-
able for criminal act3....21
he went on to state that*.
He is not to be excused from criminal res-
ponsibility if he is able to distinguish
between right and wrong - if he is able to
understand the nature of the act which he
is committing and about which inquiry is
made, and to understand the nature and the
consequences which ought to flow from it -
unless you should find that he was at the
time overpowered by some overwhelming im-
pulse proceeding from mental disease,
which, for the time being, overcame and
obliterated his volition, his will, his con-
science, his ability to control himself,
and thus led him to commit an act although
he knew it to be v/rong; or unless, when he
committed the act, he was deprived of his
own consciousness or power of self-control
by some mental disease, so that the act in
question, although it might have been done
by his hand, was not the product of his
mind and did not proceed from his will, and
so cannot correctly be said to be really in
any sense his act. He is not to be excused,
and this defendant is not to be excused,
from the consequences of any crime he may
have committed, if he had that reason and
capacity sufficient to enable him to judge
as to the particular act between right and
wrong, unless at the time he did it his
will, his moral and mental power was so
overpowered that what his hand committed
was not really done by himself.... 22
This explanation of the right and wrong test elaborates
itself into the irresistible impulse test more explicitly than
was done in Rogers. Though the test of differentiating between
^Commonwealth v., Gilbert, 165 Mass. 45.
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right and wrong is yet the main test of insanity according to
this case, it is acceded that it is possible for a man to be
so overwhelmed by an impulse caused by mental disease, that
though he can distinguish right from wrong in reference to his
particular criminal act, he is powerless to do the right thing
in the grip of the impulse. It is clear that, whereas, previous
to this case, the degree of insanity required for a criminal
defence amounted practically to total insanity in that the
reasoning ability had to be destroyed or at least damaged by
mental disease, either permanently or temporarily, now the loss
of OOIITROL over the mind to do what is known to be right, if
that control is lost because of mental disease, is acknowledged
as an equivilent defence. This new twist of loss of control was
further noted:
if he had such a mental disease, if
hi 3 mind was from mental disease in such
a state that he could not then distinguish
between right and wrong, or if he was the
victim of an uncontrollable impulse to do
wrong, though he knew it to be wrong, so
that he could not refrain from it, if his
will was overpowered and his conscience
was overpowered, and what his hand did
was not really his act, why then he is not
to be held responsible for it . 23
So far the law as interpreted in the Massachusetts cases
has set up as the test of legal responsibility the criterion of
distinguishing between moral right and wrong in respect to the
particular act at the time it was committed. Though they are
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only modifications of this test two other tests have evolved:
1. Partial insanity (insane delusions) and
8. Irresistible impulse resulting from mental
disease which temporarily overpowers the
reason or causes loss of control over the
mind.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Cooper in 1914 this latter
disputed test was further discussed. Interpreting the law the
statements of the judge read:
A person abnormally deficient in will power
and of retarded mental development, who has
killed another person under circumstances
that would constitute murder in the first
degree if he was mentally responsible, upon
an indictment for that crime can be found
to have been fully conscious of the criminal
character and consequences of his act. That
question, whether he was so mentally dis-
eases that he felt impelled to act by a power
which overcame his reason and judgment and
to him was irresistible, are questions of
fact for the jury under proper instructions
from the judge in regard to the law. 25
It ought, at this point, to be noted that the judge is
merely the interpreter of the law and that it is the jury, after
considering what the law is (as told to them by the judge) and
the evidence, who determine as a fact whether the defendant
has sufficient mentality to be held legally responsible for
his criminal actions.
The judge, in explaining the law in reference to this
case to the jurists, has pointed out two guides. The first
was that because a person is not normally able to control his
mind or if he has not what is considered average intelligence,
SSQnmmonwealth v. Cooper, 219 Mass. 1
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he is not automatically excused from criminal liability. In
other words, following the legal theory from the first case
which we have discussed, that of Commonwealth v. Rogers, we
again revert to the idea that no matter what is medically
believed to he insanity sufficient as a criminal defence, the
law requires a more acute degree of insanity to exist to ren-
der a criminal free of responsibility for his acts. The second
rephrasing of the law instructed the jury that if the evidence
warranted, the defendant could be released from responsibility
if his reasoning ability had been overcome by an irresistible
impulse. In contradiction to a previous case. Commonwealth v.
Gilbert, in which the overpowering of the control of the mind
was considered to amount to insanity, this case reiterates the
judgment found in Commonwealth v. Rogers that, if the irre-
sistible impulse overpowered the "reason and judgment" it is to
be thought of as that degree of insanity sufficient to excuse
the defendant from criminal responsibility.
The fact that there was disagreement between judges on
these two views is excellent evidence of the tendency of the
law to stick close to the ideas of former times in spite of the
efforts of the few who are forward-looking to adjust the ad-
ministration of justice in accordance with the current scien-
tific knowledge, and taking into account its most practical
application in the immediate society.
In both the Rogers and Cooper cases the definition of
insanity explicitly requires that, if partial insanity, as
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irresistible impulse, is to suffice as a test of insanity for
a criminal defence the impulse must overpower the defendant's
capacity to think or reason. This demand is in harmony with
the right and wrong test which makes it compulsory for the
intellectual faculties to be overwhelmingly deprived of their
ability to function. The Gilbert case of 1896, on the other
hand, reflecting the willingness of legal authorities to learn
from the more recently acquired knowledge of the experts on
conditions of the mind, expounded the opinion that an individ-
ual who through mental disease 7/as not able to make himself
do what he knew to be right was just as insane as the man 7/ho
had lost his knowledge of moral right and wrong. This out-
spoken case upholding the loss of control over the reason as
insanity was the first definite break with the hard bitten
theory of the right and wrong test that every person, unless
his mind was diseased, had the will pov/er to control his actions.
Such conflict between the definitions of insanity of the
different judges continues. Ho law specifically lists what
forms of insanity are adequate to cancel criminal responsi-
bility. It is only after one judge has interpreted "insanity"
and his description has been accepted or verified by judges
who in the future quote it or elaborate on it, that another
form of mental abnormality becomes satisfactory as an insanity
defence
.
Coming down to one of the most recent Massachusetts cases
claiming insanity as a criminal defence we find, much to our
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amazement, what with all of the advances made in medicine and
psychiatry, that the legal definition of insanity necessary to
absolve one of the responsibility of forming a criminal intent,
is, not alone as hazy as ever, but almost reverently hanging
on to the old theory of the right and wrong test as the abso-
lute test of responsibility. More than ever the conclusion is
inevitable that, working with the same basic assumptions of
freedom of will and subsequent responsibility for acts ensuing
from this freedom, the legal definition of insanity as a
defence cannot escape beyond the boundaries set by this theology
of our ancestors to adjust itself to include the "socially in-
efficient" of the day.
In the 1935 case of Commonwealth v. Clark, it was
announced that:
One may be convicted of murder in the first
degree though he did not have perfect and
complete appreciation of the difference
between right and wrong at the time of the
crime.
In a way, of course, this falls in line, at least logically,
with the past interpretations of the law. For the right and
wrong test in Massachusetts was always required to apply to
the -particular criminal act of the defendant. And, as it was
shown that the accused appreciated the likely consequences
of his act, then he had passed the particular right and
Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409
,
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wrong test to his own disadvantage,
Ihe confused condition of the law on insanity as a defence
was once more affirmed when this case also threw out the irre-
sistible impulse test, and it was again stated that mental in-
feriority was no criterion of responsibility:
If Miller Clark at the time that he killed
Ethel 2tuckerman, if you find that he did
kill Ethel SSuokerman, knew, or had the
mental capacity of knowing, that the act
that he was doing was wrong, that he was
liable to punishment for it, and realized
the consequences of it to Ethel Zuckerman,
then ... he is legally responsible for his
act.,.. It never has been held ... that
intellectual inferiority, or even partial
insanity, is the test to be applied to
determine the guilt of a defendant or his
legal responsibility for any crime he may
have committed.... the point you are to
decide is whether, at the moment of the
killing, the defendant had sufficient men-
tal capacity to know the act was wrong,
to realize what his duty to society was,
and what the consequences of his act might
be to him and to others. 26
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CHAPTER VI
INADEQUATE TESTS OP CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
We have seen that, though they leave much to he desired
as far as specificity and general acceptance are concerned,
there are three tests of insanity suitable as a criminal de-
fence discernible in the Massachusetts law. They are the
1. Right and wrong test
2. Insane delusions or partial insanity test
o. Irresistible impulse test
Several other tests of mental disorder, thought by doctors
and experts in diseases of the mind to be sufficient to relieve
an individual of legal responsibility for his criminal acts,
have not been regarded by the law makers as tests of insanity
adequate to make a defendant unanswerable for his crimes.
One of the more recent forms of the irresistible impulse
test of insanity, the blinding of a knowledge of right and
wrong by heightened emotions, such as anger or passion, has
been denied legal approval as a test of insanity. Moral de-
pravity has been classed in the same category as emotional in-
sanity on the ground that, in either circumstance, the indiv-
idual can distinguish between what is right and what is wrong
and should be able to control his desires for satisfaction or
revenge.
Another group of insanity defences which have been legally
rejected have to do with inferiority, both constitutional and
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mental. In the case of Devereaux in 1926 constitutional inferi-
ority was ruled out as a criterion of insanity. 2 - Deutsch made
a statement in regard to limited mentality that:
In no jurisdiction in the United States
is mental disease or mental defect con-
sidered in itself sufficient grounds for
excusing a person from criminal respon-
sibility. 28
In Massachusetts this has been substantiated many times.
In Commonwealth v. Cooper the judge instructed the jury:
The defendant, even if abnormally deficient
in will pov/er and of retarded mental devel-
opment, could be found still to have been
fully conscious of the criminal character
and consequences of his act. 2^
And in Commonwealth v. Clark the following was presented:
An expert in mental diseases, called by the
defendant, testified, from an examination
of the defendant and from hearing him testify,
that the defendant is, and was at the time of
the killing, a low-grade moron, with an in-
telligence quotient of 50, afflicted with
syphilis of the brain and spinal cord, mentally
diseased, and "medically insane", although able
to distinguish between right and wrong "to a
certain extent", and able to appreciate the fact
that, if convicted, he might die in the electric
chair. 3x:pert witnesses called by the Common-
wealth testified from extended examinations that
the defendant is, and was at the time of the
killing, the victim of an arrested case of
syphilis of the brain and spinal cord, legally
^Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 257 Mass. 391.
^Albert Deutsch, The Mentally 111 in America (Dew York,
1937), p. 391.
^Commonwealth v. Cooper, 219 Mass. 1.
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responsible and able to distinguish right
from wrong, although one of them qualified
the last statement by adding "to a certain
extent r’. 2 ^
Again, in a later case, that of Commonwealth v. ^ilenski, it
was decided that, although the defendant was of inferior in-
telligence, he retained his criminal responsibility.
The medical evidence falls far short of
proving that the mental infirmities of
the defendant deprived him of the faculty
of consciousness of the physical acts
performed by him, of the power to retain
them in his memory, and of the capacity
to make a statement of those acts with
reasonable accuracy . 31
It is an understatement to observe how striking is the ad-
herence to the old right and wrong test, and the hesitancy or
obstinacy in not considering any test of insanity satisfactory
unless the defendant's freedom of choice has been obliterated
by mental disease.
The same reasoning was operative in excluding another
similar inadequate test, that of mental age. In Commonwealth v.
Trippi there was a
...presumption that a child between 7 and
14 is incapable of forming a criminal in-
tent^This refers to physical, not mental
age.°2
But, for the person over 14, the age when reasoning ability is
presumed to be mature,
3
^Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409.
^Commonwealth v. Zilenski, 287 Mass. 125.
^Commonwealth v. Trippi, 268 Mass. 227.
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Criminal responsibility does not defend
on mental age, but on the defendant 1 s
knowledge of the difference between
right and wrong . 34
There is one other kind of insanity whose sufficiency as
a defence for crime remains in an undetermined status, and
that is insanity caused by intoxication. On the whole drunken-
ness has not been regarded as a defence. It never excuses the
commission of statutory crimes, and frees one from legal
accountability in crimes requiring specific intent only if it
can be proved that the intoxication was so marked or that by
reason of insanity ensuing from the intoxication, the defend-
ant lacked the power to form a specific intent or purpose to
commit the crime. In the last fifteen years or so, since there
has been serious study of the effects of liquor on the human
body and mind, has it been thought humane to look upon the
alcoholic criminal as a sick person rather than as a vicious
character deserving of the fullest measure of punishment. The
attitude toward the criminal, insane from intoxication, is one
instance where medical knowledge has profoundly altered the
legal thinking about a special type of criminal, at least if
not to the point of forming new laws in regard to them, to the
extent that the inadequacy of the old laws is admitted and the
desire expressed to have some concrete facts as the basis for
changing them.
All of the assumptions which have been mentioned in rela-
34IMd
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tion to the responsibility of criminals crop out in the laws
in connection with intoxication as an insanity defence. First
of all attention is placed upon whether the consumption of the
liquor was voluntary or involuntary. If the defendant drank
excessively of his own volition then his drunken condition is
no excuse for the criminal acts he commits while in that
condition unless he was so drunk that he could not form the
intent necessary to make the physical act a crime.
Temporary insanity produced immediately
by intoxication does not destroy respon-
sibility where the accused, when sane and
responsible, made himself voluntarily
drunk. 33
When the results of drinking were involuntary, as when insanity
such as delirium tremens developed, and the defendant committed
a crime he was excused from criminal liability on the ground
of insanity, regardless of the cause of the insanity. Because
a drinker, even one who deliberately intends to become intox-
icated, does not set out to become insane by the use of al-
cohol and thereby establish a defence for a specific crime
which he will then commit, insanity caused by liquor is on a
par, as far as a criminal defence is concerned, with insanity
caused by any other factors. The law has even gone so far in
making use of medical knowledge as to admit that, while there
is doubt as to whether insanity per se is inherited, the
predisposition to drink is inherited and is as serious a
3
^Massachusetts Digest Annotated , vol. 6, Cumulative
Annual Pocket (l945), section 57.
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disease as insanity, if not insanity, and that one who cannot
keep from drinking and commits a crime while drunk cannot he
held responsible. The intoxication, in short, amounts to a
disease which affects his mind and its reasoning ability and
over which he has no control. In Commonwealth v. Gilbert it
was explained that:
If the jury are satisfied that the de-
fendant's father was a man of intemperate
habits, as testified to by the witnesses
in this case, and that the defendant in-
herited a tendency to drink, which was
likely to develop an uncontrollable
appetite for intoxicating liquors and had
contracted suh appetite, then such
appetite is a disease, and intoxicating
liquors taken and used to satisfy such
an appetite are not taken and used volun-
tarily; and if the jury are satisfied that
the offence charged in this indictment was
committed while under the influence of
liquors so taken, then the intent necessary
to constitute murder is wanting, and the
defendant cannot be. found guilty, as charged
in the indictment. °
•^Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 165 Mass. 45.
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ABSTRAC'
The one unquestionable test of insanity which meets the
strict demands of the law of Massachusetts that is sufficient
to free a person from responsibility for his criminal acts is
total insanity. And total insanity, legally, is the inability
of the defendant to distinguish between moral right and wrong
in reference to his particular criminal act. If he does not
have a cognizance of the immoral nature of his deed, if he does
not know that his deed is an injustice to himself and to the
welfare of the society in which he lives, he is legally insane.
The right and wrong test implies that, if an individual under-
stands his relation to the other members of the group of which
he himself is a vital part, he will be held responsible if he
does an act which is legally wrong.
The test of so-called total insanity has passed through
two stages. As has been insinuated, at first the test of the
knowledge of right and wrong was general in scope, and was,
therefore, a most rigid test.
After a time, however, the test was defined as the capacity
to differentiate between right and wrong in regard to the
specific criminal act of the dei'endant. That is the right and
wrong test as it stands today.
Even though the right and wrong test is, in theory, the

absolute criterion of insanity necessary to excuse a man from
responsibility for his crime, through the gradual recognition
of other irresponsible insane types, two modifications of it
have become law.
One of these is, actually, a more lenient interpretation
of the right and wrong test, and is known as the irresistible
impulse test. Its evolution, also, has so far passed through
two phases. Primarily it was the right and wrong test in re-
spect to the particular criminal act. If the defendant was so
insane that, at the time he committed the illegal act, his
reasoning ability was, as a result of the insanity, so defi-
cient that he did not know the act was wrong, he was not held
accountable for it.
Later, the irresistible impulse test was altered to in-
clude a temporary loss of -power to control the reason. In
other words, the defendant might have full knowledge of the
criminality of his act and yet be entirely helpless in re-
straining himself from committing it. In the present day many
delinquent people are of this stamp. Their reasoning ability
is normal or at least is not noticeably defective but they
have not the slightest bit of will power to control their
desire to do wrong.
The second test of insanity suitable as a shield from
criminal responsibility which has made itself apparent in the
annuls of the Massachusetts law is one of partial insanity,
more commonly called insane delusions. This test requires that
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the criminal actor he so insane on one specific subject that
for any of his actions in reference to it he cannot be held
liable. The law places a restriction upon this test in order
to avoid an exploitation of it. A man, acting under an insane
delusion, however obsessed he may be by his imagination, is
not automatically excused for his criminal acts. If the facts
which he has in mind, if true, would be adequate as a defence
for a sane person committing the same act, then the insane
soul is excused. Clearly, the test is not a help to the in-
sanely deluded person who has not reason enough to be cautious
in his delusions.
These tests of criminal responsibility constitute the sum
and substance of the Massachusetts law according to the inter-
pretations expounded in actual cases tried in the courts.
To understand the status of the tests of insanity needed
to pardon one from criminal accountability in Massachusetts, it
is only necessary to know the main source of, and some of the
influences on, the law.
The chief source of Massachusetts law was the English law.
And by 1843, in England, the basic ideas of the Massachusetts
law on insanity were clearly stated. The right and wrong test
was beginning to be acknowledged as pertaining to the definite
criminal act of the defendant and not just to general morality.
The insane delusions test as now accepted in Massachusetts was
part of the English legal theory. Only the irresistible impulse
test had not been elaborated on, and that was probably because
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of the newness of the idea that some people could be caught and
swayed in the grip of a power beyond human control.
The greatest and most outstanding influence on the formu-
lation of the laws on insanity as a defence was the mode of
thinking of the early law makers. Their theology insisted that
every man had the freedom of mind to choose his own ways of
acting, and that, because of this capability to select his own
course, every man was naturally to be held responsible for his
deeds. With an unflinching determination this philosophical
belief was held by most persons. Whatever a man did he was
accountable for, and so the more wicked his criminal act the
more exacting was his punishment meted out to him by society.
Harboring such an unyielding theology the law on insanity
as a criminal defence could hardly have been made any different
than it was. And considering that assumption as basic to the
whole legal theory, even in this era, it is obvious that no
major changes in the original body of law have been possible.
Only the most conservative of modifications have been accepted.
Having adhered to the theory that every person has freedom
of will and is thus responsible for his conduct, the early
settlers in Massachusetts
,
though perhaps unconsciously, be-
lieved that every person was capable of exercising his freedom
of choice. Of all of the outgrowths of the thinking from the
old days which we still cling to, this is the most detrimental.
The presumption of the sanity of every man which is so powerful
in the law makes it particularly difficult to show that, by
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reason of insanity, a defendant cannot be punished for his
criminsl acts.
The presumption of sanity which in the court has preference
over much evidence, together with the very limited tests of
insanity make it hard to free from criminal liability any
behavioral delinquents other than those who were considered to
be such in the society of Massachusetts a few hundred years
ago.
The most promising hope of an acquisition in the near
future of a body of laws on insanity as a criminal defence
which will include a larger number of the mentally abnormal
types found in our society today, lies in the increasing
willingness shown by the law makers to try to rewrite the
rules of the criminal lav/ to conform more accurately and fairly
with the modern medico-psychiatric view of the nature of the
individual.
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